Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dakshina Garfield De Silva
Author-Name-First: Dakshina Garfield
Author-Name-Last: De Silva
Author-Name: Marina Gertsberg
Author-Name-First: Marina
Author-Name-Last: Gertsberg
Author-Name: Rachel Pownall
Author-Name-First: Rachel
Author-Name-Last: Pownall
Title: Market Evolution, Bidding Strategies, and Survival of Art Dealers
Abstract: We show the value of expertise during the evolution of a market characterized by asymmetric information. Using a unique historical data set, we show how market dynamics encourage entrants. Our results provide evidence that better informed dealers pay about 24% more for an artwork of the same quality than less informed dealers. Additionally, our results indicate that informed dealers are more likely to survive in the market. Our evidence supports the conjecture that, in common value auctions, when information asymmetries are present, dealers with better information benefit. These results have important implications for maintaining and sustaining competitive advantage.
Creation-Date: 2016
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2016_017.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 138739557
Classification-JEL: C57, D44, Z11, D47
Keywords: Auctions, Bidding, Art Dealers, Market Evolution, Common value
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:138739557