Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Klenio Barbosa
Author-Name-First: Klenio
Author-Name-Last: Barbosa
Author-Name: Dakshina De Silva
Author-Name-First: Dakshina
Author-Name-Last: De Silva
Author-Name: Liyu Yang
Author-Name-First: Liyu
Author-Name-Last: Yang
Author-Name: Hisayuki Yoshimoto
Author-Name-First: Hisayuki
Author-Name-Last: Yoshimoto
Title: Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue
Abstract: This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.
Creation-Date: 2019
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2019_012.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 267027285
Classification-JEL: C57, C58, D44
Keywords: Treasury Security Auctions, Discriminatory Auctions, Uniform Auctions, Revenue Equivalence
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:267027285