Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Elias Bouacida
Author-Name-First: Elias
Author-Name-Last: Bouacida
Author-Name: Renaud Foucart
Author-Name-First: Renaud
Author-Name-Last: Foucart
Title: The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems
Abstract: We report the results of two experiments on the social acceptability of random devices in allocation mechanisms. A majority of subjects do not opt for a lottery if they can rationalize an alternative mechanism as non-random. It is, however, possible to design a payoff-equivalent mechanism to the lottery that is more acceptable. Our results shed light on the real-world reliance on obscure criteria in allocation problems where lotteries seem to be simpler and more efficient.
Creation-Date: 2020
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2020_013.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 301646245
Classification-JEL: D01, D78, D91
Keywords: lotteries, mechanism design
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:301646245