Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya
Author-Name-First: Trivikram
Author-Name-Last: Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya
Author-Name: Herve Moulin
Author-Name-First: Herve
Author-Name-Last: Moulin
Author-Name: Indrajit Ray
Author-Name-First: Indrajit
Author-Name-Last: Ray
Author-Name: Sonali Sen Gupta
Author-Name-First: Sonali
Author-Name-Last: Sen Gupta
Title: Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games
Abstract: In a public good provision or a public bad abatement situation, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of provision or abatement. In the familiar class of n-person quadratic games, we show that Coarse Correlated equilibria (CCEs) - simple mediated communication devices that do not alter the strategic structure of the game - can significantly outperform the Nash equilibrium in terms of the policy objective above.
Creation-Date: 2020
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2020_014.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 301895429
Classification-JEL: C72, Q52
Keywords: Quadratic game, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Abatement level, Efficiency gain
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:301895429