Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Alexander Matros
Author-Name-First: Alexander
Author-Name-Last: Matros
Author-Name: David Michael Rietzke
Author-Name-First: David Michael
Author-Name-Last: Rietzke
Title: Contests on Networks
Abstract: We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is "connected" to<br/>a set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the Tullock and all-pay auction contest success functions (CSFs), and show that many well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the structure of the network. We also obtain a new exclusion result: We show that, under both CSFs, equilibrium total effort may be higher when one player is excluded from the network. This finding contrasts the existing literature, which limits findings of this sort to the all-pay auction CSF. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.
Creation-Date: 2017
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2017_006.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 156630581
Classification-JEL: C72, D70, D85
Keywords: Network Games, Contests, Bipartite Graph, Tullock Contest, All-pay Auction
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:156630581