Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Laurent Bouton
Author-Name-First: Laurent
Author-Name-Last: Bouton
Author-Name: Paola Conconi
Author-Name-First: Paola
Author-Name-Last: Conconi
Author-Name: Francisco Pino
Author-Name-First: Francisco
Author-Name-Last: Pino
Author-Name: Maurizio Zanardi
Author-Name-First: Maurizio
Author-Name-Last: Zanardi
Title: Guns, Environment, and Abortion: How Single-Minded Voters Shape Politicians' Decisions
Abstract: We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians choose to support or oppose regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians <br/>flip-flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators' votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with our model's predictions, election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators. These effects only arise for non-retiring senators, who represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity has no impact on senators' decisions on reproductive rights, because of the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.
Creation-Date: 2018
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2018_005.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 232397092
Classification-JEL: D72, I18, K38, Q00
Keywords: Electoral incentives, Environment, Gun control, Reproductive Rights
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:232397092