Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya
Author-Name-First: Trivikram
Author-Name-Last: Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya
Author-Name: Herve Moulin
Author-Name-First: Herve
Author-Name-Last: Moulin
Author-Name: Indrajit Ray
Author-Name-First: Indrajit
Author-Name-Last: Ray
Author-Name: Sonali Sen Gupta
Author-Name-First: Sonali
Author-Name-Last: Sen Gupta
Title: Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game
Abstract: Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining at<br/>least the level of utility from the Nash outcome.
Creation-Date: 2019
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2019_009.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 266042710
Classification-JEL: C72, Q52
Keywords: Abatement game, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Efficiency gain
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:266042710