Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar
Author-Name-First: Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib
Author-Name-Last: Anwar
Author-Name: Jorge Bruno
Author-Name-First: Jorge
Author-Name-Last: Bruno
Author-Name: Renaud Foucart
Author-Name-First: Renaud
Author-Name-Last: Foucart
Author-Name: Sonali Sen Gupta
Author-Name-First: Sonali
Author-Name-Last: Sen Gupta
Title: Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World
Abstract: We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational<br/>learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions.<br/>We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.
Creation-Date: 2023
File-URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2023_002.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Number: 377534420
Classification-JEL: C72, D82, H41
Keywords: Public Goods, Groups, Position Uncertainty, Voluntary Contributions
Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:377534420